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Abstract: 
We construct long-run sustainability indicators based on changes in Comprehensive Wealth – which 
we refer to as Genuine Savings - for Germany over the period 1850-2000. We find that German 
sustainability indicators are positive for the most part, although they are negative during and after the 
two World Wars and also the Great Depression. We also test the relationship between these wealth 
changes and a number of measures of well-being over the long-run: changes in consumption as well as 
changes in average height and infant mortality rates. We find a positive relationship between GS and 
our well-being indicators over different time horizons, however the relationship breaks down during 
WWII. We also test if the Genuine Savings/Comprehensive Wealth framework is able to cope with 
massive disinvestment at the end of World War 2 due to war-related destructions and dismantlement. 
We find that negative rates of Genuine Savings were by and large avoided due to the accumulation of 
technology and growth-friendly institutions. We demonstrate the importance of broader measures of 
capital, including measures of technological progress, and its role in the process of economic 
development; and the limits of conventional measures of investment to understand why future German 
consumption did not collapse. 
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1. Introduction 
2016 marked the beginning of the United Nation’s Sustainable Development (SD) Goals, 
replacing the Millennium Development Goals which ran until 2015. The United Nation’s SD 
Goals, which are planned to run until 2030, cover 17 areas with the main objective of ending 
poverty in all its forms and promoting ‘sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth’. 
How to measure the sustainability of economic growth and development is clearly an important 
question, therefore. In this paper, we use Germany’s development over the period 1850 to 2000 
to illustrate the link between SD, measured by Genuine Savings (GS), and future well-being, 
measured by per-capita consumption and anthropometric indicators. Our paper takes a new 
look at what factors contributed to changing living standards in Germany over a period of 150 
years which included two major world wars, and the aftermath of these wars (especially World 
War Two). In particular, we are interested in how changes in comprehensive wealth can explain 
trends in future well-being over this period.  
Genuine Savings (GS) is an indicator of sustainability based on the concept of wealth 
accounting (Hamilton & Hepburn 2014).1 Ideally, GS measures how a country’s total capital 
stock (physical, natural, social or institutional & human) changes year-on-year, since this stock 
of “comprehensive wealth” is seem as key to determining future well-being. Hamilton & 
Clemens (1999) and World Bank (2006, 2011) show trends in estimates of GS for most 
countries in the world and they outline how a negative GS indicator can be interpreted as a 
signal of unsustainability.2 National level World Bank estimates of GS stretch back to the 
1970s, and provide empirical evidence of the level of sustainable/unsustainable economic 
                                                          
1 A similar approach is also adopted by the Arrow et al. (2012)/UNDP (2012, 2014), who also focus on measuring 
wealth and changes in wealth as a measure of sustainability. 
2 The World Bank has annually updated estimates and the most recent estimates covered 159, 152 and 131 
countries in 2011, 2012, 2013: Data taken from http://data.worldbank.org/topic/environment  [accessed 7 March 
2016].  
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development throughout the world. At the global level, mean GS was 12.7 per cent of Gross 
National Income in 2014, however there was considerable variation in the data with values 
ranging from -27.9 to 36.9 per cent of Gross National Income. 
Applying similar concepts to the longer historical record can inform policy makers about 
the sustainability paths adopted by countries, and about the factors determining the evolution 
of consumption over time. Recent scholarship has constructed long-run GS estimates for 
Britain, and shows that throughout its history Britain’s GS rates have been positive on the 
whole (Greasley et al. 2014). A subsequent paper by Hanley et al. (2016) tested the theoretical 
properties of GS using a 3 country panel including Germany, finding that GS predicted changes 
in future consumption up to 50 years ahead. Both of these papers showed the key importance 
of including a measure of technological change – changes in TFP – in the GS indicator, to 
improve its predictive ability. 
This paper utilises the checkered history of Germany as a case study, for which we construct 
and analyse detailed measures of German GS over the period 1850-2000. The case study 
approach taken in this paper offers a more thorough and systemic analysis of changes in 
comprehensive wealth and the consequences for German well-being than Hanley et al. (2016). 
By specifically focusing on the German experience, more insight can be obtained on the 
underlying drivers of Total Factor Productivity, and how the SD indicators relate to alternative 
well-being indicators to the consumption-based measure used in Hanley et al (2016). Over the 
period 1850 to 2000, Germany underwent unification and was a belligerent in two World Wars 
and also experienced the Great Depression. During this time period, German GS rates averaged 
11.16 per cent of GDP, with a coefficient of variation of 0.84. German GS rates were 
consistently positive apart from during the two World Wars and the Great Depression. 
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Indeed, using German economic development as a case study offers insights into 
prospects for modern-day emerging economies, in terms of the impacts of (un)sustainability of 
current economic development. During its rapid phase of industrial industrialisation in the 20th 
century, Germany was more a follower than a leader in terms of economic progress. Its success 
was partly based on its role as a latecomer to the first Industrial Revolution, and an imitator of 
previous development successes in countries such as the UK. Germany was also a pioneer in 
the “second industrial revolution” in the field of chemistry and electricity, but its success was 
also based on exploitation of national resources and rising emissions of air and water pollutants. 
The lessons of German development are therefore relevant for modern developing countries, 
as Germany was a late developer in the nineteenth century and, unlike Britain, not the 
pioneering economy. Moreover, in terms of trends in comprehensive wealth3, the combination 
of all stocks of capital, 1850’s Germany shares similarities with many countries today. World 
Bank (2011, table 2.1) estimates of wealth for all countries in 2005 indicated that ‘intangible 
capital’ - human capital, social and institutional capital – comprises over 50 per cent of total 
wealth globally (in low-, lower middle-, upper middle- and high-income countries). In 1850, 
69 per cent of German wealth was also comprised of ‘intangible capital’ and the remainder in 
produced and natural capital. How changes in the stocks that make up comprehensive wealth 
evolved is central to this study, because this metric reflects the basis for future income and 
consumption paths (Ferreira, Hamilton and Vincent, 2008; Greasley et al. 2014).4 
                                                          
3 Refereed to as “total wealth” by the World Bank. 
4 In terms of income levels, at the start of our period of study Germany’s GDP per capita was $GK 1428, it not 
only lagged behind contemporary leaders such as the UK ($GK 2330) and the USA ($GK1806), but it was 
considerably less well-off than developing countries in more recent years. For example, a number of world regions 
former USSR (GK$7877), Latin America ($GK 7027), East Asia ($GK 2267), West Asia ($GK 6931) and Africa 
($1924) had higher GDP per capita levels in 2008 than Germany in 1850 (Bolt & Van Zanden 2013).   
5 
 
 
 
Furthermore, we use German disinvestment due to dismantlement and war-related 
destruction as a natural experiment in the context of sustainability.5 This historical setting may 
serve as a basis to see how the theoretical model copes with these economic shocks, or whether 
the theoretical properties only hold in peacetime economic scenarios – this is extremely 
relevant for many developing countries today that continue to experience military conflicts. 
Indeed, for Germany we find that the main implications of the theory of SD is consistent with 
empirical facts for Germany over the long run if the value of technological progress is 
incorporated into our savings estimates. We find that the largest year-on-year falls in 
consumption per capita occurred during and immediately after the First and Second World 
Wars. However, the German economy was resilient enough to overcome these consumption 
shocks, regardless whether well-being is proxied by conventional, monetary metrics, or by 
alternative indicators such as average height and infant mortality. This resilience can be 
attributed to a range of accumulations in the comprehensive wealth stock which offset the loss 
of physical capital which has been well-described by economic historians. 
Capital formation is the basis for any GS calculation and is a long-serving concept in 
growth accounting. The formation of capital has been discussed in various historical and more 
contemporary settings, such as the industrial revolution (see for example Rostow 1960).The 
study at hand makes use of the comprehensive wealth framework to add a novel facet to the 
existing literature on German economic growth in the long-run. Earlier approaches to explain 
Germany’s rise focused on the role of the heavy industry (Tilly 1991); the interaction between 
the transportation sector and its demand for iron products (Fremdling 1977); the role of 
                                                          
5 However, as noted by a reviewer, the world wars, especially the Second World War, should be treated with care 
in a discussion of causes and consequences of economic development. We do not claim that the world wars were 
perfectly exogenous to economic development as there are potentially endogenous links to natural resources (or 
the lack thereof), hyperinflation, capital flows and monetary policy and corresponding political, economic and 
societal tensions. 
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railways in fostering market integration (Fremdling 1975); the unique features of the banking 
sector and its role in industrial development (Tilly 1986, Guinnane 2002, Fohlin 2007). 
Broadberry (2004) analyses productivity and technology more broadly and highlights the role 
of the German service sector that enabled the German economy to overtake British productivity 
levels. As for the post-war period, discussion regarding German growth ‘miracle’ after WW2 
include the role of the ‘Marshall Plan’ (Berger and Ritschl 1995), and whether post-war 
German growth should be interpreted as catch-up growth or convergence (Eichengreen and 
Ritschl 2009, Vonyo 2008, 2012). Factors that have been found to be helpful in explaining 
growth during this period include technological progress, including spill over effects through 
foreign direct investment, previous saving rates and physical capital accumulation, institutions, 
but also the undervalued German mark (see Bittner 2001 for a thorough discussion).  
The economics of sustainable development has a strong focus on  inter-temporal 
welfare, and the links between previous investment / saving rates and future returns in terms 
of consumption and well-being. The GS methodology allows a range of broader assets, such 
as human capital, social capital, natural resource use, pollution and technology accumulation 
to be accounted for in explaining long-run trends in well-being (Ferreira et al. 2008); this is 
where the central contribution of this study of German economic experiences post 1850 lies. 
 
2. The economics of sustainable development  
SD as a concept is a broad church with growing literatures in several academic disciplines 
(e.g. earth sciences, ecology, economics, and sociology: see Rogers et al. 2008). The focus of 
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this study is the economic approach to SD. This paper draws on a well-established theoretical 
literature – see Hanley et al. (2015) for an extensive review.6  
The Genuine Savings approach follows the weak sustainability paradigm, as it assumes a 
high degree of substitutability between the different assets which make up a country’s stock of 
comprehensive wealth. Using the definition of SD from the Brundtland Report,7 the weak 
approach to sustainability links future well-being with changes in this stock of wealth or capital 
(Pearce, 2002). The underlying logic is that future consumption can be seen as a return on past 
wealth accumulation. The GS approach to sustainability rests partly on the so-called Hartwick 
(1977) Rule , which shows how consumption can be constant over time if rents from natural 
resource extraction are re-invested in other forms of capital (i.e. man-made or human).8 A 
macro level test of SD is to examine whether, year-on-year, an economy’s per capita stock of 
comprehensive wealth is falling, rising, or remaining constant in value terms.9  The intuition 
of Pearce and Atkinson (1993) was that countries with positive levels of GS would satisfy a 
requirement of weak sustainability, since by implication their total capital stocks would not be 
declining in value.   
                                                          
6 The degree of substitutability between the different forms of capital which make up comprehensive wealth is an 
empirical question and it is one which is difficult to establish empirically (i.e. Markandya and Pedroso-Galinato 
(2007)).  
7 ‘Sustainable Development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their own needs. It contains within it two key concepts: the concept of ‘needs’, in 
particular the essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea of 
limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organisations on the environment’s ability to meet 
present and future needs’ (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p.43). 
8 One of the attractions of GS is that it is grounded in the system of national accounts (SNA) framework and can 
be used to measure and compare countries in a consistent manner. 
9 Conceptually, Genuine Savings (GS) is an aggregate figure, representing the value of year-on-year changes in 
the capital stock of a country. Theoretically, these changes are most accurately measured when shadow prices are 
used, reflecting the marginal value product of each stock in terms of its contribution to welfare. This, in turn, is 
defined as the present value of aggregated utility over infinite time. Empirically, actual market prices and costs 
are used instead to proxy for shadow prices Moreover, prices for some environmental assets do not exist due to 
missing markets. 
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Most empirical tests of the predictive power of GS follow the empirical strategy of Ferreira 
and Vincent (2005) and Ferreira et al. (2005). The test is based on the representation of the 
long-run equilibrium relationship between GS and future well-being derived in Ferreira and 
Vincent (2005): 
PVCt =  β0 + β1St + ε (1) 
where PVCt is the present value of changes in future consumption over some defined time 
period as evaluated at period t. The most stringent test from this specification relates to whether 
the β1 coefficient on the sustainability indicator equals to 1 and whether the β0 coefficient is 
zero, implying a one-for-one relationship between the SD indicator and the measure of future 
well-being. This has not been found in practice and less stringent tests are whether β1  positive 
and greater than 0.10 The approach taken in the present paper follows that of Greasley et al. 
(2014) and Hanley et al. (2016), who investigate the long-run relationship between future 
consumption and comprehensive investment in a series of countries. For the UK, data is 
analysed over the period 1760-2000, for Hanley et al. data for the USA, Germany and the UK 
are analysed over the period from 1870-2000. They found that the choice of time horizon and 
discount rate respectively, had the greatest effect on the estimated parameters than the 
alternative net savings measures used. Overall, they found that the inclusion of measures of 
technological change, which they proxied using the present value of changes in Total Factor 
Productivity (TFP) substantially improved the power of prediction of the estimated parameters, 
giving β1 coefficients close to 1. This was interpreted by the authors as suggesting the GS was 
indeed a forward looking of consumption, even over periods 50 years ahead. 
                                                          
10 See Hanley et al. (2015) for a review of the empirical literature 
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3. German GS estimates, 1850-2000 
We largely follow the World Bank (2006, 2011) methodology for calculating GS to calculate 
a range of increasingly-comprehensive measures of year-on-year changes in total capital for 
Germany over time. We construct the following indicators: 
1. Net investment = net fixed produced capital formation and overseas investment 
2. Green investment = indicator (1) + ∆ natural resource rents 
3. Genuine Savings (GS) = indicator (2) + ∆ human capital stocks 
4. GS carbon = indicator (3) + carbon emissions 
5. GreenTFP = indicator (2) + the present value of TFP growth 
6. GSTFP = indicator (3) + the present value of TFP growth 
The subsequent section outlines the historical trends in these data and a more comprehensive 
description of data and sources is provided in the accompanying data appendix. 
 
3.1 Changes in produced and net overseas capital: net investment. 
The net investment series we use comprises domestic net investment in produced capital (e.g. 
factories, machine tools, and transport links) and changes in foreign net capital stock, of which 
domestic investment is the major component. 11 Overall net investment varied around a 10 per 
                                                          
11 Information on net investment are taken from Hoffmann, W.G., Grumbach, F., Hesse, H., 1965. Das Wachstum 
der deutschen Wirtschaft seit der Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, Heidelberg, New York., 
which still serves as the main source for German historical national account series.   Hoffmann et al.’s (1965) 
investment series has been subject to criticism (see for example Fremdling and Stäglin 2003). We are aware of 
the shortcomings of these data and try to address them in the spirit of Vonyo (2012) and Scherner (2013). Given 
the lack of adequate alternative data, we follow the examples of Broadberry (2004) and Metz (2005) and use 
Hoffmann’s series. We are confident that, despite Hoffmann et al.’s (1965) shortcomings, our data base serves as 
a valuable data basis for an empirical analysis. In Adjusted Net Savings frameworks accuracy of levels are 
certainly desirable, but more important are long-run trends for methodological reasons. A wide array of German 
historical national account statistics using Hoffmann et al.’s figures can be downloaded under 
www.gesis.org/histat. 
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cent of GDP during the mid-19th century. During the heyday of the German economy in the 
late 19th and early 20th century, net investment increased to approximately 15 per cent of GDP. 
Massive shocks occurred during the First World War, the inter-war years, and especially 
towards the end of the Second World War and the immediate post-war years when war 
destruction and dismantlement resulted in highly negative net saving rates.12 German net 
investment was generally positive during the Nazi era, resulting in capital accumulation, 
especially in the heavy industries (Kirner, 1968; Vonyó, 2012). During the years of the 
“economic miracle”, net savings rate were on an all-time high, ranging between 15 per cent 
and 20 per cent. Until the mid-1970s net savings rates subsequently declined to a level under 
10 per cent and remained there for most of the period between 1975 and 2000 (Figure 1).  
 
3.2 Natural capital 
Natural capital consists of all “gifts of nature”, including renewable and non-renewable 
resources, agricultural land, ecosystems and biodiversity (Barbier, 2011). Unfortunately, it was 
only possible to include a sub-set of these assets due to a lack of data, including a lack of a 
historical time series for non-market environmental resources. Changes in the natural capital 
stock are calculated from data on physical changes in certain stocks (e.g. due to depletion, for 
non-renewables) and the per-unit rental values of these changes. Renewable sources include 
forestry and coastal fisheries. In terms of forestry, the only noteworthy changes to the German 
forest stock seem to occur due to changes in territory. Given the nature and size of these 
                                                          
12 Our statistical sources do not allow us to unambiguously differentiate between losses in capital due to 
destruction and dismantlement. The latter includes cash payments, but also in kind payments, such as machinery, 
manufacturing plants and part of the infrastructure. See Guinnane (2015) on details on German debt, reparations 
and the 1953 London Agreement on German External Debt. Also, there were plans to destroy the German 
armament industry. The combined effect on German capital stock was estimated by Krengel (1958), whose data 
we use below. 
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changes, we have not included changes in forestry stock in our metric. In the non-renewable 
sector, the most important commodities for Germany are brown and hard coal. Data on natural 
gas and crude oil depletion, iron ore, copper ore, zinc ore, lead ore, silver ore, tin ore, and nickel 
ore extraction are also included, but contribute only small shares to the overall figure on 
resource depletion. Costs of production have been subtracted from gross revenues using wages 
and employment figures in order to estimate the economic rent per unit of resource extracted.  
Figure 1 illustrates the net-contribution (gross revenues minus average extraction costs) of non-
renewable resource depletion. 
 
3.3 Changes in the stock of human capital 
The stock of human capital is an important component of comprehensive wealth (World Bank 
2011). There are a number of ways of calculating stocks of human capital and therefore 
deriving changes in the stock for the purpose of constructing GS. World Bank (2006, 2011) 
calculates human capital as a residual from total wealth, whilst Arrow et al. (2012) calculate 
human capital using Mincer equations, elsewhere McLaughlin et al. (2014) calculate stocks of 
human capital using the discounted lifetime earnings. Here we follow Hamilton and Clemens 
(1999, p.334, 336) who argue that investment in human capital can be proxied using education 
spending.13 Figure 1 indicates that schooling expenditure in Germany, including investment in 
primary, secondary, and tertiary education, generally increased from under 1 per cent of GDP 
in the mid-19th century to 6.2 per cent in 1974. In the nineteenth century Prussia was in fact a 
leader in the provision of publicly funded education (Lindert, 2004). Significant slumps 
occurred during the 1920s, the Second World War and the post-war years. Slumps during the 
                                                          
13 This method has limitations as it assumes that schooling equates to human capital development and it excludes 
on the job training, apprenticeships and other informal forms of human capital development 
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1920s and the war years are the result of disproportionate inflation of GDP relative to absolute 
education expenditure and a disproportionate economic upswing, respectively. Low human 
capital investment rate in the late 1940s are the result of generally low education expenditures 
combined with economic recovery. In terms of capturing information on public expenditure on 
schooling, we believe that our data series reflects this better than data provided by the World 
Bank database as this assumes education expenditure to be at a constant 4.3 per cent of GDP, 
whereas we utilise more accurate estimates provided by Diebolt (1997, 2000).  
 
3.4 Carbon costs caused by pollution 
In a further step, environmental costs due to pollution are included in changes to comprehensive 
wealth, based on the idea that emissions of greenhouse gases deplete the global assimilative 
capacity for such emissions, and thus constitute a negative investment flow which should be 
priced according to estimates of marginal damage costs per tonne of emission (e.g. Pezzey and 
Burke 2014, Kunnas et al. 2014). Over most of the period between 1850 and 2000, trends in 
German CO2 emissions correspond with overall economic activity, with increases before the 
end of the Second World War, brief interruptions in the 1920s and 1930s, a deep slump in the 
mid- and late-1940s, followed by a steep increase until the mid-1970s when absolute CO2 
emissions started to decline. We use prices from Tol (2012) and discount the 2000 price, DM 
37.96, in accordance with the growth rate of future prices (e.g. 1.99 per cent per annum). 
Expressed as a percentage of GDP, the value of carbon yields a small negative cost. Given the 
low value of carbon emissions relative to GDP, we do not anticipate that the inclusion of carbon 
in GS will affect our results dramatically.14  
 
                                                          
14 See Kunnas et al. (2014) for a more comprehensive treatment of the issue of carbon pricing. 
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3.5 Changes in the value of exogenous technological progress (TFP) 
One of the important drivers of modern economic growth is Total Factor Productivity or the 
‘Solow Residual’. However, the World Bank (2006, 2011) does not incorporate estimates of 
technological change or TFP in their adjusted net savings metrics. The importance of 
incorporating measures of technological change in sustainability indicators is illustrated by 
Weitzman (1997). TFP growth implies that even if capital stocks remain constant over time, 
potential output will increase due to efficiency gains.  The significance of including a measure 
of technological change is further underscored in the Ferreira & Vincent (2005) test of GS’s 
predictive power. They attributed the poor performance of GS at explaining changes in future 
consumption in OECD countries to the fact that TFP is attributed as being a driver of economic 
growth in OECD countries compared with factor accumulation in developing countries. As 
Pezzey et al (2006) note, the correct measure for technological progress which one includes in 
GS adjustments should be exogenous technological progress, which they refer to as a “value 
of time passing”. 
Therefore, we have incorporated the effects of exogenous technological progress in our 
measure of GS by including the present value of TFP growth. We calculate TFP assuming a 
standard Cobb-Douglas production function with capital and labour measured in manhours.  
Y = AL(1-α)Kα 
where A denotes TFP which is estimated as a residual from this calculation, with α=0.37. We 
have estimated trend TFP growth using sources outlined in the appendix, and follow Pezzey et 
al. (2006) in that we use this to estimate the present value of the changes in GDP over the 
coming 20 year period in any accounting period to proxy the “value of time” or value of 
exogenous technological progress. The mean TFP growth rate of our series is 1.57 per cent 
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(figure 2) and, in line with Weitzman (1997), we find that incorporating technological progress 
can make a sizeable adjustment to our indicators with the present value of TFP averaging 31.39 
percent of GDP over the period 1851-2000. 
For our purposes it would perhaps be ideal to measure TFP by incorporating human capital 
developments in the production function. This is the direction that recent theoretical and 
empirical research has taken when estimating TFP growth, such as Baier et al. (2004) and 
Manelli and Seshadri (2014). Particularly, Baier et al. (2004) find that incorporating a measure 
of human capital reduces the size of the residual but the resulting TFP growth rate is still 
sizeable. In the case of Germany, Baier et al. (2004), after incorporating human capital 
estimates, still find TFP growth of 1 per cent per annum. Moreover, Manelli and Seshadri 
(2014) argue that better measurements of human capital quantity and quality can further reduce 
TFP growth rates. For our purposes an alternative to our measure of TFP would be to 
incorporate data on human capital stocks, e.g. decadal from Baier et al. (2014) or Morrison and 
Murtin (2009), instead of labour per manhour.15 Table 1 compares the TFP growth rates 
incorporating the data on human capital (with α=0.37) and our own calculations as well as the 
corresponding effect on the calculation of the net present value of TFP. The average TFP 
growth rate from Baier et al. is 61 per cent of our estimates of TFP using man hours and the 
TFP growth rate incorporating data from Morrison & Murtin (2009) is 87 per cent of the TFP 
growth rate calculated using man hours. 
However, for the purposes of estimating changes in capital stocks, choosing to incorporate 
estimates of human capital stocks in our measure of TFP means we must also include better 
                                                          
15 Baier et al. (2014) estimate decadal human capital stocks using data on years of schooling and mincer equations 
with constant coefficients for the returns to education and experience. Using the same underlying data as Baier et 
al. (2004), Morrison and Murtin (2009) have also estimated human capital stocks with calculated stocks reported 
as average years of schooling of the population at decadal intervals. 
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measures of the changes in the stock of human capital to the genuine savings estimates above. 
Data limitations prevent us from doing so, and reducing the size of the Solow residual without 
having equivalent improvements in changes in the stock of human capital would lead to mis-
measurements of changes in the stock of human capital. We therefore opt to incorporate an 
unadjusted TFP series in our estimates, however in the results presented below we illustrate 
the effect of TFP appended to Green investment to avoid the possibility of double counting as 
education expenditure is already included in GS as a proxy for changes in human capital. 
Moreover, the ‘Solow Residual’ encompasses factors in addition to technological progress 
which are unaccounted for in the production process, such as changes in institutions and social 
capital. Institutional change is an attractive explanation for the odd combination of highly 
negative investment between 1944 and 1948 and high growth in future consumption, since the 
Nazi regime was replaced by a more democratic political process after 1945 which paved the 
foundations for a functioning market economy, stabilizing the economy at large.  
 
3.6 Well-being indicators over time 
The underlying theory of SD indicators posits a link between Genuine Savings and future well-
being/utility. In the theoretical work and in empirical tests, this is typically taken as implying 
a relationship between GS and the present value of future changes in consumption. We have 
collected data on private consumption per capita over the period 1850 to 2009, and this is used 
to measure changes in future well-being.16 Limited as it may be, this reflects the economic 
outcomes for a population in constant monetary units. To implement the hypotheses tests set 
out earlier derived from Ferreira et al. (2008), the present value of the change in future 
                                                          
16 This ignores the value of changes in the value of leisure time over the period, and other elements of full 
consumption. 
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consumption was calculated over four time horizons (30, 50, and 100 years ahead) using a 1.95 
per cent discount rate (the average real interest rate in Germany from 1850-2010).17 Figure 3 
illustrates the present value of changes in consumption per capita over three different time 
horizons are presented.  
An interesting facet evident in the underlying consumption data is that from 1850-2009 
there is a year-on-year decrease in consumption in a total of 55 years, 36.66 percent of the data. 
However, when we calculate the present value of changes in consumption over the various time 
horizons (30, 50, and 100 years), we get much a lower number of negative values for the 30 
year horizon, and none for the 50 and 100 year time horizons.  Given Germany’s eventful 
history – two World Wars interspersed with the Great Depression caused significant scars both 
from an social and economic point of view – a key question is why these drastic events did not 
result in a substantial decrease in future consumption. We only find two negative values over 
the 30 year horizon (1914 and 1915) and none for 50 or 100 horizons. Thus, despite collapses 
in our conventional measures of GS (1-4 above) in 1919, 1931-32 and 1945-1948, and although 
there are some year-on-year falls in consumption, we do not find similar drops in the present 
value of future changes in consumption. Why did German consumption not collapse and what 
factors other than conventional investment measures account for this? We believe that this may 
be explained by considering broader measures of capital which take into account changes in 
social and institutional capital.  
                                                          
17 From a theoretical perspective, we should use flexible discount rates since investment, planning horizons, risk 
and opportunity costs may have varied over time. Ideally, we would have discount rates for every single year, and 
for every year we should have non-constant discount rate pertaining to different planning horizons (see Gollier 
2013 for a thorough discussion). However, due to the lack of reliable and meaningful discount rate for Germany 
over the long-run we decided to follow the lead of pioneer studies (see Greasley et al. 2014, Hanley et al. 2015, 
Hanley et al. 2016). 
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Moreover, the theory underlying the properties of GS as a SD indicator relates the evolution 
of comprehensive wealth to future consumption paths. However, it has been argued that such 
conventional monetary-oriented welfare measures may be inaccurate when substantial shares 
of economic activity, such as subsistence farming or illicit markets are not included in official 
statistics. Alternative metrics may help to address this shortcoming and help to assess the wider 
implications of a country’s long-term savings and investment strategy. We use infant mortality 
rate (IMR) and average male height to gain a fresh view on the impact of investment on future 
well-being in the long run. These metrics are frequently used as output-oriented proxies for 
living standards, reflecting the disease environment, nutritional standards and medical 
technology available (Baten and Blum, 2013; Gnegne, 2009). IMR is a non-monetary measure 
that reflects health standards but also informs about the health and education of women and 
poverty levels (figure 4). Average height can be interpreted as net-nutrition; this is gross 
nutritional intake less energy requirements to deal with diseases, physical labour, quality of 
housing, etc (figure 5).18 
 
4. Testing the empirical relationship between Genuine Savings and future well-being 
Figures 6a and 6b show the results of our calculations of GS for Germany and table 2 outlines 
decadal averages of all components outlined in section 3. Using the empirical strategy outlined 
in section 2, we have tested the relationship between increasingly comprehensive indicators of 
wealth changes and the present value of changes in future consumption. As noted in section 2 
, this is based on a theoretical relationship between changes in capital in the accounting period 
and future changes in well-being. In the strong version of the theory, we should find β1 = 1 and 
                                                          
18 There is a rich literature in this field, for example see: (Baten and Blum, 2012; Baten and Blum, 2013; Floud et 
al., 2011; Fogel et al., 1982; Komlos and Baten, 2004; Steckel, 1995). 
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β0 = 0, since in the absence of positive net investment the future change in consumption is 
expected to be zero. A weaker test of the theory is to examine whether β1 > 0. 
Corresponding numerical results over three different time horizons are shown in table 3. 
Here β0, β1, the results of a series of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests, and several F-tests 
are shown. We use the ADF test to investigate whether the consumption and comprehensive 
investment series are cointegrated in order to assess a potential long-term relationship. F-tests 
are applied to test the hypotheses that β1 = 1, and that β0 = 0 and β1 = 1 jointly. In our benchmark 
results our preferred discount rate is 1.95 per cent, which is based on real returns to German 
government bonds over the time period.19  
We test the relationship between the present value of future changes in consumption 
(using a 1.95 per cent discount rate) and a set of investment metrics over 30, 50 and 100 year 
time horizons. In general, results indicate the existence of a positive relationship (β1 > 0) 
between current investment and future well-being measured as private consumption. However, 
depending on the time horizon and investment indicator, the coefficient indicating the 
magnitude of this relationship varies considerably. The majority of tests indicate that β1 > 1 
and these coefficients tend to be larger for longer time spans, although for the 50 year horizon 
there is a break down in the relationship. We also test the hypothesis that β1 > 0 and → 1 as the 
investment metric includes more types of capital, again with the exception of the 50 year 
horizon. We find that this is the case for the 30 and 100 year horizons when we consider 
resource extraction, education expenditure, and costs of pollution as parts of net investment in 
comprehensive wealth.  
 
                                                          
19 Appendix 1 includes a series of robustness tests which accounting for an alternative discount rates, a 3 % rate 
based on and also using a 3.0 per cent discount rate (the average rate of real GDP growth over the time period) 
and territorial/boundary changes, confirming the result presented below. 
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4.1 War shocks as a natural experiment and the role of TFP 
Germany’s experience during and immediately after the Second World War can be seen as a 
natural experiment that allows the assessment of the consequence of disinvestment due to war-
related destruction and dismantlement in the GS framework.20 These disinvestments are man-
made consequences of political and military actions.  
The theoretical models underlying GS, such as described in Hamilton and Withagen 
(2007), do not take into account shocks such as war-related destruction and dismantlement in 
Germany during and after WWII although there is a need to take shocks into account in 
empirical models (Perron 1989). Figure 7a illustrates the relationship between GS and present 
value of future changes in private consumption over a 50 year time horizon for the German 
case. A series of extreme values, referring to the years between 1944 through 1948, are located 
in the upper left of the scatterplot to illustrate this effect. Negative investment rates can be 
explained by capital being destroyed and damaged during the war years, whilst positive 
differences in future consumption are mainly driven by a catch-up growth and consumption in 
the post-war era. When the Ferreira et al. (2008) empirical strategy is applied to German data, 
the resulting estimated relationship is indicated by the dotted line. In this case, the existence of 
a small number of outliers reduces the value of the coefficient, systematically underestimating 
the empirical relationship between investment and discounted future consumption growth. If 
we were to exclude the war and post-war period, empirical tests might reflect a relationship 
between GS and utility more in line with the theory (solid line).21  
                                                          
20 Conversely, the First World War was not as destructive as the Second World War (De Long and Eichengreen 
1991, p.22-23); Germany’s economy was severely affected during 1914-19, but did not experience man-made 
destructions comparable to those occurred during 1944-48. As a result, the inclusion of 1914-19 has little impact 
on our results. Furthermore the early years of the Second World War were seen as a boom to Germany as its 
capital stock grew significantly (Kirner 1968). However, the final years of the War, Germany’s economy suffered 
from massive war-related destructions, followed by post-war dismantlement. 
21 Using a 3 % discount rate gives an identical relationship to that discussed above: see Appendix 1. 
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The conventional GS framework (table 3) has been designed as a tool to address gradual 
developments in investment and consumption; on its own it cannot account for the future 
sustainability of the German economy, as is indicated by the outlying observations which 
combine massive disinvestment and surprisingly high future consumption values. 
Consequently, the conventionally estimated relationship between investment and present value 
of future changes in consumption is mis-represented, which is illustrated by the rather flat 
regression line (dotted line).  
As noted above, TFP incorporates all inputs not accounted for in the underlying production 
function, including social and institutional capital and, as was shown in section 3.5, when 
estimates of the human capital stock are incorporated into a measure of TFP the residual does 
not fall to zero. This suggests a role for other variables unaccounted for such as technological 
progress as well as social & institutional capital.  
Germany (East & West) are widely considered to have undergone significant institutional 
change following the second world war, this is evident from the Polity IV database which 
shows Germany transitioning from a high level of autocratic regime to a high democratic 
regime following the end of the War (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2014). Landmark institutional 
changes in the immediate post-war period include the trials of war criminals at Nuremburg 
(1945-6), followed by agreements to bolster German industry, Marshall Aid and Federal 
elections (1949) (Carr 1991). Authors have also highlighted the democratisation, military 
occupation and Marshall Aid programs ($200 per capita in 2001 prices) (Dobbins 2003). 
Whereas, the Eastern experience was significantly different, with authoritarianism and little 
external assistance, instead asset striping was more prevalent. 
In terms of social capital, a number of authors argue that German social capabilities explain 
post-war recovery (Olson 1982, Dumke 1990, DeLong and Eichengreen 1991, Dobbins 2013). 
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Putnam (2000, p. 402) argues that creating/re-creating social capital can be eased by a palpable 
national crisis such as a war, depression or natural disaster. In the case of the US in the twentieth 
century, Putnam (2000, pp 268-271) highlights the role of World War II as a collective 
experience and by ‘accentuating civic and social equality’. The post-WWII defeat in Germany 
can be considered such a palpable national crisis, particularly in that the country was under 
occupation.22 De Long and Eichengreen (1991) also highlighted that out of all the European 
reconstructing nations, Germany, the country with the strongest US influence, was the most 
successful performer in the post-War period.  Furthermore, Dobbins (2003) argues that a key 
feature in the reconstruction of the German economy, which contrasts strongly with more 
recent efforts in Somalia, Haiti and Afghanistan, was not that Germany was a highly developed 
economy returning to trend growth but rather that it had high levels of social capital; it was not 
divided ethnically, socio-economically or tribally. Thus, as these accounts highlight, the post-
War period has multi-faceted institutional change both internally and externally which explain 
post-war economic growth and why GDP, and thus consumption, in Germany did not 
experience a collapse. 
To investigate the role of intangible assets, such as social capital and institutions, we 
run two sets of regressions and show corresponding β1 coefficients. These regressions aim at 
showing a correlation between investment metrics and future changes in consumption without 
bearing the risk of distortion by the difficulty of finding a monetary metric for social capital 
and institutions. Results, shown in table 4, indicates that the monetized value of TFP is an 
important addition to conventional components of augmented saving and investment 
metrics.When technology (TFP) is incorporated, the value of β1 drops for all time horizons. In 
                                                          
22 Social capital was re-built in Germany as evident by rrecent estimates of social capital in Germany suggest 
relatively high levels, with Lee et al. (2011) ranking Germany just below the UK, at 14th out of 72 countries. 
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this case we also find that β1>0 for the 30-year time horizons and β1>1 for time horizons 
exceeding 30 years, and that this coefficient is closer to the size predicted by theory (β1 = 1). 
The hypothesis that β1 = 1 & β0 = 0 jointly is rejected on the basis of this set of tests. 
Additionally, we apply a set of cointegration tests to assess a long-term relationship between 
aforementioned investment indicators and present value of future consumption at any given 
point in time.23 This measure helps us to assess this relationship from a different angle. We 
find that in our preferred 1.95 per cent scenario both series are cointegrated over 100 years if 
conventional investment and GS metrics are considered, but not for shorter periods. This is in 
line with the prediction of the underlying theoretical models discussed in section 2 which 
assume an infinite time horizon  
 
4.2 GS and alternative indicators of well-being 
A large body of research suggests that monetary income metrics are insufficient to fully capture 
well-being, especially during the early stages of economic development. Differences in the size 
of the shadow economy, public goods and non-monetary market activities motivate the use of 
alternative, outcome-oriented welfare indicators (Schneider 2005; Steckel 1995). 
Unfortunately, there is no defined theoretical relationship between alternative non-
monetary indicators of well-being and GS that we can base hypothesis tests on. However, 
previous empirical studies have attempted to determine if in fact there is a correlation between 
                                                          
23 As highlighted by a reviewer, the time series used in the cointegration analysis should be discussed in light of 
their ‘stickiness’. While we consider nominal wages to be rather sticky, there is empirical evidence that real wages 
are quite volatile in Germany, especially during the mid-nineteenth century, the two world wars, and the interwar 
period, predominantly due to inflations rates (Kuczynski 1947). Similarly, recent research using alternative 
consumption metrics suggests that wellbeing during WW1 was seriously affected by the lack of consumption 
possibilities (Blum 2011; Cox 2013); similarly, the food crisis in Germany immediately after the end of WW2 
constitutes a structural break in German consumption (Jürges 2013). Furthermore, disinvestment during the world 
wars suggests that investment during the period under observation is also not as sticky as economic intuition 
suggests. This holds even more for comprehensive indicators, such as ANS, since it is composed of monetary 
indicators, such as expenditure in education, which can be marginalised in times of inflation. 
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GS and non-monetary indicators of well-being. Gnégé (2009) looks at the correlation between 
GS and changes in both IMR and the Human Development Index (HDI) using data for 36 
countries over the period 1971 to 2000. In general, Gnégé (2009) found a positive relationship 
between GS and future changes in IMR with coefficients ranging from 27.64 and 36.87 over 
15 year time horizons. For HDI, coefficients ranged from 0.043 to 0.571 for 5 and 10 year 
horizons. Gnégé (2009) concluded that the results would be more consistent with theory if they 
could be tested over a longer time horizon.  
We thus first compare GS with corresponding values of IMR and average male height. 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 illustrate how GS increases constantly prior to the Second World War, 
experiencing slumps during the First World War and economic crises in the 1920s and 1930s. 
After a substantial break with highly significant saving rates between 1944 and 1948 due to 
war-related effects, GS increased rapidly. Corresponding development in IMR and average 
height reflect this development to some extent only. IMR during the 19th century did not show 
a clear trend despite growing GS. Beginning in the early 20th century IMR fell rapidly, with a 
modest increase during the Second World War. After 1948, GS increased substantially while 
the velocity of IMR declines slowed down.  
Similarly, average height does not follow a clear trend until the late 19th century. The 
series indicates rising average heights until 1914, when food shortages led to deteriorating 
living standards during First World War (Blum, 2011; Blum, 2013b). During the interwar 
period, economic turmoil and the Nazi government’s autarchy policy put downwards pressure 
on nutritional and health standards in Germany (Baten and Wagner, 2003). The Second World 
War did not lead to decreasing heights, but hindered further improvements. Between 1945 and 
the 1960s German heights experienced substantial increases due to improvements in food 
quantities and quality, as well as medical advances and reduced physical work burden.  
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Interestingly, substantial increases in GS during the 1980s did not lead to increases in 
IMR and average height of the same magnitude. The reason for this apparent contradiction lies 
in the nature of the target variable which is supposed to reflect outcomes of previous 
investments. However, IMR cannot improve beyond zero, and average height is not likely to 
be outside a certain biological minimum and maximum. The measurement space in both 
anthropometric metrics has natural and biological limits, and approaching these limits 
corresponds with decreasing returns to utility, i.e. health and nutrition (Blum 2013a). Average 
height values reached towards the end of the height series indicate that a biological limitation 
is close; in fact Germans born in the late 1970s are not far off the average height values 
observed in the tallest of countries, such as the Netherlands (Baten and Blum 2012). On the 
other hand, investment does not face similar boundaries as it can – at least in theory – grow 
almost infinitely, since its value is determined not only by quantity but also but its price. Any 
analysis combining previous investments and future anthropometric outcomes needs to take 
this phenomenon into account. 
Following Gnégé (2009), we assess the correlation between both future changes in infant 
mortality rates and average heights and GS in the long run using Germany as an example. We 
plot GS against the changes in average height over 30 years (hollow circles), obtaining a 
generally linear relationship between these two variables (figure 7b). However, the effect of 
WW2 prevents a coefficient to pick up the otherwise linear relationship between GS and 
changes in height; a dashed regression line indicates the slope of a (linear) regression 
coefficient if the war effect is not controlled for. When we use GS including the value of TFP, 
however, this war effect seems to be outweighed by the value of technology (solid circles). 
However, Germany’s TFP grew substantially during the 1930s and early 1940s, adding value 
on the GS+TFP metric; therefore, the following increases in height over 30 years are 
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disproportionately small because by this time Germany was among the tallest populations 
already and diminishing returns to consumption resulted in smaller increase in height compared 
with what the conventional GS framework implies. The result is a somewhat orthogonal-shaped 
distribution of observations, with GS+TFP having a beneficial effect on height growth for the 
period before the mid-1930s, and a negative relationship thereafter; a solid and a dotted 
regression line illustrate the idealised relationship between GS+TFP and changes in height 
before and after this reference point, respectively. 
A similar problem occurs when using the infant mortality rate (IMR) to proxy 
improvements in the health status of the German population. Generally, the theoretical 
framework linking investment and future changes in consumption suggests a negative 
relationship between GS and IMR since positive GS rates are expected to reduce the IMR. 
Indeed, we do find such a negative correlation for the period before 1920 (figure 7c). Solid 
lines indicate the relationship between reduction in IMR over 30 years using GS (hollow 
circles) and GS + TFP (solid circles) as proxies for investment. For the period thereafter, 
however, we find a positive relationship between these variables (dashed regression lines). 
Again, the reason for the positive relationship – increasing investment coincides with lower 
reductions in IMR – is the nature of this metric. IMR has a natural lower limit of zero and 
Germany’s IMR is on fairly low levels in the 1930s. Reductions on low IMR require more time 
and resources than on higher IMR levels due to diminishing returns to investment with respect 
to Germany’s disease environment. 
We calculate measures of changes of 5, 10, 20, 30 and 50 year time horizons, and have 
tested over shorter horizons (5 and 10) to correspond with the horizons tested by Gnégé (2009). 
We do not test the hypothesis that there is a one-to-one relationship between investment and 
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resulting welfare as outlined above since these alternative welfare proxies are not considered 
by standard theoretical reasoning. Instead, our null hypothesis is that positive levels of (ln) GS 
per capita at time t should be associated with improving measures of IMR and height at some 
future period. Both anthropometric metrics are ordered by time of birth. While this procedure 
is straightforward in the case of IMR, the rationale to do this for average height is that the 
crucial period for the determination of final average height is the first three years in life. The 
results, presented in tables 7 and 8, are intuitive as the shorter the time horizon the less likely 
we are to find a strong correlation between changes in our well-being indicators and our 
measures of GS. What we do find though are that the size of the coefficients increase 
significantly the longer the time period considered, from 1.311 to 34.72 in the case of lnGS and 
2.704 to 48.93 for the case of lnGSTFP thus emphasizing the importance of long-run analyses 
for capturing the full effect of comprehensive investment metrics on future well-being. With 
average heights we find that the shorter time horizons (5 and 10 years) perform very poorly. 
But as the time horizons increase we see stronger positive relationships between future changes 
in heights and lnGS. In the case of lnGSTFP we find an even stronger relationship with future 
changes in heights and also significant cointegrating relationships. However, in the case of 
IMR we do not find evidence of cointegrating relationships. In sum, although this methodology 
differs from the conventional strategy of capturing future changes in well-being, they do 
indicate that there is a positive correlation between lnGS and future changes in well-being, 
however it is defined.  
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5. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have constructed long-run estimates of savings-based sustainability indicators 
for Germany over the period 1850 to 2000. We found that over this period, German GS rates 
were positive for the most part except for the two World Wars and the Great Depression. We 
also tested the predictive power of GS by constructing tests of the relationship between GS and 
the present value of future changes in consumption.  
The results presented in table 3 and table 4 found that increasingly comprehensive 
indicators of sustainability were good predictors of future changes in well-being. For example, 
the β1 coefficients of our GSTFP metric (GS including TFP) ranged from 0.781-1.380, with 
theory predicting a value of 1. Our results were sensitive to both time-horizon and discount 
rate. In the German case, our results were also very sensitive to the effects of wars as these had 
dramatic effects on both investment and consumption. However, including the present value of 
changes in total factor productivity as a means of picking up changes in technology and social 
capital in the course and immediate aftermath of the war changes the relationship between net 
investment and future consumption, and helps us to understand the positive German 
consumption pattern despite the major physical destructions and dismantlement which 
occurred during and after the Second World War.  
Another contribution of this paper was to analyse the relationship between GS and 
alternative measures of well-being, namely average heights and infant mortality. Generally, we 
found a positive correlation between future changes in both IMR and heights and our GS 
metrics. The framework developed by Ferreira et al. (2008) of a one-for-one relationship 
between increases in GS and well-being does not automatically transfer, as these 
anthropometric variables are different in nature. Our result suggest that on low levels of 
economic (and anthropometric) development, using these metrics as an alternative to 
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conventional, monetary metrics can be a fruitful exercise; however, we do not find these 
metrics suited to assess the relationship between Genuine Savings and well-being on more 
advanced stages of development.  
In conclusion, our paper shows that tracking changes in comprehensive wealth, 
including measures of social capital and technological change, can help develop a useful means 
of both thinking about causes of historical patterns of economic growth and well-being, but 
also of predicting future changes in well-being, at least when per-capita consumption is used 
as a well-being measure. Simply tracking changes in produced capital is inadequate for these 
purposes since changes in all of the assets on a which a country depends need to be ideally 
accounted for. Germany’s experiences over the period 1850-2000 show this clearly.
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Table 1 Estimates of TFP incorporating human capital versus Labour (man hours) 
 TFP growth rate (%) NPV TFP% of GDP  
Baier et al. (2004) 0.97 18.06 
Morrison & Murtin (2009) 1.37 26.72 
Authors’ calculations 1.57 31.39 
 
Table 2: Decadal averages of Sustainability indicators (% of GDP) 
 
 Net Green GS GS carbon GS + TFP Green+ TFP 
 % % % % % % 
1850s 8.25 7.88 8.60 8.59 23.76 24.10 
1860s 10.26 9.78 10.66 10.64 26.49 24.95 
1870s 11.79 11.06 12.13 12.10 28.44 27.17 
1880s 10.89 10.06 11.47 11.43 33.65 28.66 
1890s 13.29 12.14 13.73 13.67 37.99 32.41 
1900s 13.96 12.41 14.38 14.27 42.01 37.07 
1910s 13.64 11.57 13.65 13.50 59.29 45.23 
1920s 9.69 8.29 9.90 9.74 54.72 49.02 
1930s 7.04 5.85 8.73 8.57 62.99 53.83 
1940s -9.51 -10.71 -8.60 -8.82 47.13 45.00 
1950s 16.92 13.80 16.60 16.23 70.12 66.69 
1960s 17.11 15.70 19.55 19.22 57.63 57.89 
1970s 10.92 10.17 15.86 15.54 45.87 42.93 
1980s 8.08 7.52 12.65 12.34 41.00 35.15 
1990s 6.51 6.47 10.73 10.49 36.61 31.85 
1850-2000 9.90 8.78 11.33 11.16 44.60 40.18 
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Table 3: Estimated parameter values for alternative measures of investment when future wellbeing is measured by the PV of 
consumption per capita over 20-100 years horizons, 1.95 per cent / year discount rate  
Dependent variable 
Independent 
variable β1 
Standard  
error β0 
Standard  
error β1=1 β0=0; & β1=1 ADF R² Sample 
PV Cons.  30  Net 1.636*** (0.253) 1,128*** (366.1) 6.30** 24.45*** -1.674 0.246 1850-1979 
PV Cons. 50    0.063 (0.479) 3,099*** (500.4) 3.82* 22.48*** 0.270 0 1850-1959 
PV Cons. 100    3.356*** (0.233) 355.0** (154.9) 101.97*** 420.48*** -3.189** 0.781 1850-1909 
PV Cons.  30  Green 1.596*** (0.272) 1,343*** (362.8) 4.81** 25.45*** -1.564 0.212 1850-1979 
PV Cons. 50    -0.301 (0.501) 3,313*** (480.3) 6.73** 25.58*** 1.167 0.003 1850-1959 
PV Cons. 100    3.629*** (0.288) 366.8** (174.8) 83.44*** 361.19*** -2.909** 0.733 1850-1909 
PV Cons.  30  GS 1.515*** (0.199) 1,016*** (342.1) 6.67** 22.77*** -1.695 0.311 1850-1979 
PV Cons. 50    0.0774 (0.486) 3,088*** (512.3) 3.61* 21.89*** 0.141 0 1850-1959 
PV Cons. 100    3.279*** (0.226) 327.6** (155.2) 101.77*** 416.19*** -3.107** 0.784 1850-1909 
PV Cons.  30  GScarbon 1.520*** (0.204) 1,037*** (343.9) 6.53** 22.94*** -1.686 0.303 1850-1979 
PV Cons. 50    0.0217 (0.488) 3,126*** (510.6) 4.01** 22.25*** 0.276 0 1850-1959 
PV Cons. 100    3.298*** (0.229) 324.9** (156.6) 100.63*** 412.15*** -3.087** 0.781 1850-1909 
Note: “PV Cons. N” refers to the present value of changes in future consumption over a N year horizon. In the columns β1=1 and β0=0 &β1=1 the results of a set of Wald-
tests are reported which indicate whether aforementioned hypotheses in regard to size of β0 and β1 have to be rejected. Statistically significant coefficients suggest rejection. 
In the column labelled ADF results of a set of Augmented Dickey Fuller statistic which was used to perform the Engle-Granger (1987) two-step method to test for 
cointegration. Statistically significant values indicate a cointegrated relationship. The degree of augmentation is determined by the Hannan-Quinn Information Criteria. ***, 
**, and * indicate rejection of the null of non-stationary residuals at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4: Estimated parameter values for alternative measures of investment when future wellbeing is measured by the PV of 
consumption per capita over 20-100 years horizons, 1.95 per cent / year discount rate 
Dependent variable 
Independent 
variable β1 
Standard  
error β0 
Standard  
error β1=1 β0=0; & β1=1 ADF R² Sample 
PV Cons.  30  GreenTFP 0.861*** (0.0573) -660.9** (294.4) 5.90** 24.07*** -2.398 0.639 1851-1979 
PV Cons. 50    1.327*** (0.135) -620.7 (478.1) 5.85** 3.54** -2.449 0.474 1851-1959 
PV Cons. 100    1.460*** (0.064) 145.1 (108.2) 51.66*** 222.62*** -3.407** 0.901 1851-1909 
PV Cons.  30  GSTFP 0.781*** (0.0523) -551.5* (290.2) 17.51*** 39.87*** -2.173 0.637 1851-1979 
PV Cons. 50    1.294*** (0.13) -685.9 (478.5) 5.10** 2.78* -2.432 0.48 1851-1959 
PV Cons. 100    1.380*** (0.0593) 169.1 (105.2) 41.08*** 191.55*** -3.393** 0.905 1851-1909 
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Table 7: Estimated parameter values for investment indicators and future changes in infant mortality rates 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable β1 
Standard  
error β0 
Standard  
error 
R2 ADF Sample 
∆imr5 lnGS 1.311 (2.218) -18.17 (15.47) 0.014 -4.070** 1850-1993 
∆imr10  2.45 (2.906) -36.83* (20.09) 0.036 -2.678* 1850-1988 
∆imr20  10.21*** (3.445) -114.1*** (23.62) 0.203 -2.727* 1850-1978 
∆imr30  19.39*** (3.903) -197.4*** (26.5) 0.44 -1.585 1850-1968 
∆imr50  34.72*** (8.023) -335.2*** (53.3) 0.502 -1.573 1850-1948 
∆imr100  28.94*** (7.863) -420.0*** (48.78) 0.365 -1.618 1850-1898 
∆imr5 lnGSTFP 2.704 (2.298) -32.35* (18.5) 0.011 -4.114*** 1851-1993 
∆imr10  3.789 (2.795) -51.81** (22.5) 0.014 -2.998** 1851-1988 
∆imr20  12.64*** (3.041) -145.9*** (24.45) 0.121 -3.576*** 1851-1978 
∆imr30  22.32*** (3.244) -243.5*** (25.88) 0.283 -2.101 1851-1968 
∆imr50  48.93*** (5.387) -487.8*** (42.28) 0.429 -2.334 1851-1948 
∆imr100  45.51*** (8.717) -566.5*** (62.45) 0.372 -1.978 1851-1898 
 
Table 8: Estimated parameter values for investment indicators and future changes in average male heights 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent 
variable β1 
Standard  
error β0 
Standard  
error 
R2 ADF Sample 
∆height5 lnGS -0.15 (0.236) 1.867 (1.553) 0.004 -4.093 *** 1850-1974 
∆height 10  -0.00573 (0.281) 1.449 (1.848) 0 -3.466*** 1850-1969 
∆height 20  0.313 (0.345) 0.565 (2.253) 0.009 -2.189 1850-1959 
∆height 30  0.667* (0.362) -0.34 (2.355) 0.036 -1.494 1850-1949 
∆height 50  1.571*** (0.377) -3.271 (2.427) 0.186 -1.807 1850-1929 
∆height5 lnGSTFP 0.149 (0.179) -0.3 (1.398) 0.006 -4.433*** 1851-1974 
∆height 10  0.404* (0.224) -1.704 (1.741) 0.03 -3.814*** 1851-1969 
∆height 20  1.048*** (0.257) -5.408*** (1.984) 0.143 -3.050** 1851-1959 
∆height 30  1.552*** (0.262) -7.825*** (2.01) 0.27 -2.434 1851-1949 
∆height 50  2.176*** (0.299) -9.476*** (2.247) 0.408 --3.404** 1851-1929 
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Figure 1: German net investment, resource depletion and education expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, 1850-2000 
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Figure 2: German trend TFP growth, 1851-2008 
 
Note: Data on labour hours worked and real GDP is taken from Hoffman (1965) and Greasley and Madsen (2006). 
Information on capital stock for the period 1850 through 2000 is provided by Metz (2004). Missing values during 
and after the Second World War have been estimated on the basis of Krengel (1958). Factor shares used were 
from Greasley and Madsen (2006), labour share of 0.63 and a capital share of 0.37 based on average labour share 
of GDP from 1850-2008. A Kalman filter of the TFP growth rate was estimated, this was used to calculate the 
present value of TFP’s contribution to GDP growth (in line with Pezzey et al. (2006)). 
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Figure 3: Present value future changes in consumption per capita, (1990 DM, 1.95% 
discount rate) 
 
Figure 4: Infant Mortality Rate and Genuine Savings in Germany, 1850-2000 
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Figure 5: Average height (in cm) in Germany and Genuine savings per capita, 1850-
2000 
 
 
Figure 6a: Net, Green and GS in Germany, 1850-2000 
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Figure 6b Genuine Savings per capita (with and without the present value of changes in 
TFP) 1851-2000  
 
Figure 7a: Investment and future consumption over 50 years (1.95% discount rate) 
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Figure 7b: Investment and changes in average height over 30 years 
 
Figure 7c: Investment and changes in infant mortality over 30 years 
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Appendix 1 Robustness tests: accounting for an alternative discount rates and 
territorial changes 
As a first robustness check, we switch to an alternative discount rate of 3 per cent, which is 
based on real GDP growth of the German economy during the period under observation (table 
A1). For this scenario, we conclude again that the incorporation of present value of changes in 
future TFP improves the quality of the analysis. A comparison of values presented in Table A2 
illustrates that investment metrics which do not incorporate TFP suffer from aforementioned 
distortion (for a comprehensive comparison see tables A1). Among the undistorted results of 
this set of regressions we also find a positive relationship (β1 > 0) throughout all investments 
measures and time horizons. Here, empirical results are similar to the ones using a 1.95 per 
cent benchmark and also indicate the existence of a positive relationship between current 
investment and future utility (β1 > 0). For unbiased estimates, we also find that β1 > 0 and → 1 
when additional forms of investment are considered over all time horizons. The opposite is true 
when looking at well-being changes over 100 years ahead: the value of β1 for conventional net 
investment is fairly close to the predicted value of 1; incorporating additional forms of 
investment leads to a divergence of this coefficient from the value 1. Adding technological 
change confirms β1 > 0, but not β1 > 0 and → 1. In the 3 per cent scenario we also reject the 
hypothesis that β1 = 1 & β0 = 0. For cointegration tests, we find conventional investment series 
are equally cointegrated with the present value of future consumption over 100 years, 
indicating that there is no particular advantage of adjusted net saving indicators in this regard.  
The evidence presented in tables 3 and 4, the results are sensitive to both time horizons and 
discount rates. We assess the role of discount rates in the prediction framework by expressing 
β1 coefficients, which are results of a set of regression models, as a function of a range of 
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discount rates between 0.10 and 3 per cent. The variables affected by changing discount rates 
are the present value of future changes in consumption and also the present value of TFP. The 
results for the correlation between GS (incl. TFP) and the present value of future changes in 
consumption over 30, 50, and 100 year spans are shown in figure A1.24 For lower discount 
rates, β1 coefficients tend to be larger whereas for high discount rates the opposite is true. 
Moreover, the longer the time span under observation the sharper is the response (decline) in 
terms of β1 coefficient to increasing discount rates. Of all our time spans, the 100 year period 
is most sensitive to changes in the discount rate with β1 coefficients ranging from 6.05 to 0.37. 
We also use this mechanism to identify an ‘optimal’ discount rate that is necessary to 
obtain the β1 value of 1 that is implied by theory. For 30 years this is clearly impossible given 
that the starting levels are below 1. The 50 year horizon has a β1 coefficient equal to 1 at a 
discount rate of approximately 3 per cent; the corresponding intersection point of the 100 year 
horizon is approximately 2.24 per cent. These coefficients enable us to evaluate how suitable 
our chosen discount rate is in the German case. The 1.95 per cent rate in our preferred scenario 
is based on real returns to German government bonds, while the results of our calibration 
exercises, shown in figure 8, suggest 2.24 per cent for 100 years horizon which is in close 
proximity to the rate suggested by historical national accounts, and 3 per cent is close to a long-
run GDP growth rate. 
We run another robustness test, simulating the continuous existence over the period 
under observation of the former Western part of Germany as it existed between 1945 and 1989 
in order to address the multiple territorial changes which occurred over the period. The most 
important territorial changes include the temporary annexation of Alsace-Lorraine (1871-
                                                          
24 Correlations between GS and the present value of future changes in consumption (incl. war years) show a similar 
story with the 100 year horizon most sensitive to choice of discount. At no point does the 50 year horizon have a 
β1 coefficient equal to 1. 
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1918), as well as territorial losses after 1918/19 and 1945. Moreover, the figures used in this 
compilation for the post-1945 period do not include the East German economy. Accordingly, 
most statistics fall short of covering an “unchanged” German territory, potentially biasing the 
results of our empirical tests. To find appropriate metrics to weight Germany’s territories, we 
use Maddison (1995) who reports the economic power for the territories that formed former 
Germany. For example, in 1936, the territory which later forms ‘West Germany’ accounts for 
64 per cent of total economic power at the time. The territory that becomes ‘East Germany’ 
accounts for approximately 25 per cent; the territories east to the Oder-Neisse line account for 
the remaining 11 per cent. In 1990, the Western part of the re-united Germany accounts for 
approximately 90 per cent of the total figure. These weights are used to construct estimates of 
GDP, net investment, private consumption and pollution series for West Germany. We use 
Maddison’s (1995) per-capital figures and census population figures provided by the Statistical 
Office of the German Empire (1910) to estimate the economic weight of the territories lost 
after WWI. 
For resource extraction, figures are available allowing detailed adjustments even for 
smaller territorial units. Most significantly, territories east to the Oder-Neisse line accounted 
for approximately half of the hard coal extraction before WWI, and East Germany accounted 
for approximately 70 per cent of overall German brown coal production, but only 3 per cent of 
hard coal production. Other minerals and energy sources account for very little compared to 
hard and brown coal production. Accordingly, we subtract 70 per cent of brown coal production 
for the pre-1945 period, 3 per cent and 50 per cent of hard coal production for pre-1945 and 
pre-1918 period, respectively, to obtain a continuous West Germany series. For education 
expenditure, given the similar institutional standards we assume that per-capita expenditure 
was fairly similar throughout Germany. Therefore, we use shares of population in respective 
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territories to identify education expenditures in West Germany. Territories ceded to Poland 
after WWI – other territories constitute a negligible share – account for approximately 4.4 per 
cent of Germany’s population. East Germany and the territories annexed by Poland and the 
Soviet Union after WWII accounted for approximately 37 per cent of pre-war population 
(Maddison 1995, German census 1910). We adjust education expenditure using these 
population shares to obtain hypothetical West German data series. The result of this exercise 
confirms earlier results. Results are almost identical, irrespective whether the analysis is based 
on actual German figures, or on hypothetical West German ones (see Table A2). 
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Table A1: Estimated parameter values for alternative measures of investment when future wellbeing is measured by the PV of 
consumption per capita over 20-100 years horizons, 3 per cent /year discount rate  
Dependent variable 
Independent 
variable β1 
Standard  
error β0 
Standard  
error N β1=1 
β0=0; & 
β1=1 ADF R² Sample 
PV Cons.  30   Net 1.427*** (0.219) 937.9*** (315.9) 130 3.81* 19.07*** -1.723 0.25 1850-1979 
PV Cons. 50    0.0601 (0.379) 2,353*** (395.5) 110 6.16** 19.12*** 0.442 0 1850-1959 
PV Cons. 100    0.839*** (0.124) 705.3*** (82.48) 60 1.67 154.27*** -2.970** 0.44 1850-1909 
PV Cons.  30   Green 1.393*** (0.235) 1,125*** (313.2) 130 2.80* 20.59*** -1.611 0.216 1850-1979 
PV Cons. 50    -0.23 (0.396) 2,525*** (379.6) 110 9.63** 22.68*** 1.533 0.003 1850-1959 
PV Cons. 100    0.894*** (0.144) 715.9*** (87.21) 60 0.55 167.34*** -2.877** 0.401 1850-1909 
PV Cons.  30   GS 1.320*** (0.172) 840.9*** (295) 130 3.47* 16.55*** -1.753 0.316 1850-1979 
PV Cons. 50    0.0596 (0.384) 2,352*** (404.9) 110 6.00** 18.51*** 0.545 0 1850-1959 
PV Cons. 100    0.815*** (0.122) 701.6*** (83.53) 60 2.31 142.57*** -2.968** 0.437 1850-1909 
PV Cons.  30   GScarbon 1.325*** (0.176) 859.9*** (296.6) 130 3.43* 16.82*** -1.744 0.308 1850-1979 
PV Cons. 50    0.0155 (0.386) 2,383*** (403.6) 110 6.50** 18.93*** 1.354   0 1850-1959 
PV Cons. 100    0.819*** (0.123) 701.5*** (83.94) 60 2.18 143.20*** -2.959** 0.434 1850-1909 
PV Cons.  30   GreenTFP 0.793*** (0.0544) -546.3** (258.2) 129 14.47*** 38.63*** -2.424 0.626 1851-1979 
PV Cons. 50    1.079*** (0.122) -413.3 (394.7) 109 0.43 0.60 -2.299 0.424 1851-1959 
PV Cons. 100    0.395*** (0.0483) 653.5*** (76.23) 59 157.29*** 105.99*** -3.307** 0.54 1851-1909 
PV Cons.  30   GSTFP 0.715*** (0.0492) -451.5* (253.7) 129 33.51*** 62.07*** -2.200 0.625 1851-1979 
PV Cons. 50    1.052*** (0.117) -470.9 (395.2) 109 0.20 1.10 -2.289 0.431 1851-1959 
PV Cons. 100    0.372*** (0.0452) 659.8*** (75.12) 59 192.95*** 144.52*** -3.314** 0.543 1851-1909 
Note: Discount rate of 3 per cent per anno was chosen on the basis of average real growth rate of the German economy during the period under observation. 
Also see table 1 for notes. See also table 1. 
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Table A2: Alternative discount rates, 1.95% and 3%, Germany and West Germany 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Germany Germany 
West 
Germany 
West 
Germany 
  1.95% 3% 1.95% 3% 
PV Cons.  30  Net 1.636*** 1.427*** 1.163*** 1.040*** 
PV Cons. 50   0.063 0.0601 -0.179 -0.137 
PV Cons. 100   3.356*** 0.839*** 3.925*** 1.265*** 
PV Cons. 30  Green 1.596*** 1.393*** -1.216*** -1.088*** 
PV Cons. 50   -0.301 -0.23 0.183 0.125 
PV Cons. 100   3.629*** 0.894*** -4.184*** -1.339*** 
PV Cons. 30  GS 1.515*** 1.320*** -0.844** -0.769*** 
PV Cons. 50   0.0774 0.0596 0.495 0.366 
PV Cons. 100   3.279*** 0.815*** -4.656*** -1.476*** 
PV Cons. 30  GScarbon 1.520*** 1.325*** -1.086*** -0.978*** 
PV Cons. 50   0.0217 0.0155 0.231 0.155 
PV Cons. 100   3.298*** 0.819*** -4.520*** -1.442*** 
PV Cons. 30  GreenTFP 0.861*** 0.793*** 1.474*** 1.382*** 
PV Cons. 50   1.327*** 1.079*** 2.048*** 1.719*** 
PV Cons. 100   1.460*** 0.395*** 3.635*** 1.447*** 
PV Cons. 30  GSTFP 0.781*** 0.715*** 0.814*** 0.749*** 
PV Cons. 50   1.294*** 1.052*** 1.568*** 1.299*** 
PV Cons. 100   1.380*** 0.372*** 1.584*** 0.551*** 
Note: Please see tables 3 and 4 for additional information on these empirical tests.  
 
Figure A1: β1 coefficients by time horizon as a function of the discount rate applied 
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Appendix 2: Data appendix 
 
Table 1a: Descriptive statistics (refer to results presented in table 2): 
 
N Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Net investment 151 1209.17 961.84 1171.45 -4883.35 4527.06 
Green 151 1100.75 847.24 1136.14 -4940.30 4456.82 
Genuine Savings 
(GS) 151 1559.38 990.55 1628.96 -4713.19 6245.64 
GS carbon 151 1529.91 975.93 1596.84 -4717.17 6133.14 
GS TFP 150 5551.64 3253.44 4694.88 -256.09 16352.83 
Green TFP 150 5090.10 3151.64 4139.48 -483.19 14473.07 
PVC 30 years 130 2735.24 983.69 3511.25 -1073.66 9360.81 
PVC 50 years 110 3141.31 1179.44 4033.04 -944.89 12046.91 
PVC 100 years 60 2375.34 2085.09 1070.67 421.86 4381.07 
Note: All investment measures are corrected for population changes; consumption: present value of future private 
consumption. 
 
Data sources 
GDP and GDP deflator: Pre-1975 data on German national product is available from Flora et 
al. (1983) and Hoffmann et al. (1965). GDP levels for later periods are taken from German 
Statistical Yearbooks (1999, 2008). Missing periods 1914-1924 and 1940-1949 were estimated 
using Ritschl and Spoerer’s (1997) GNP series. A GDP deflator was constructed using data 
from Hoffman et al. (1965), Mitchell (2007) and the United Nations Statistical Division (2013). 
 
Net investment: Net investment from 1850-1959 is provided by Hoffmann et al. (1965). We 
estimated the gap during 1914-1924 using Kirner (1968) who reports investment in buildings, 
construction, and equipment by sector for the war and inter-war periods. The period 1939 to 
1949 was estimated by using data on net capital stock provided by Krengel (1958).25 To 
                                                          
25 Despite the existence of several estimates and approximations of the development of investment we stick to 
Krengel’s (1958) data (Vonyó 2012, Scherner 2013). 
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estimate investment during 1960 to 1975 we used Flora et al.’s (1983) data on net capital 
formation. For the period 1976 to 2000 we use official World Bank (2010) and United Nations 
(2013) investment statistics to complete the series. Data on the change in overseas capital stock 
and advances is provided by Hoffmann et al. (1965). Gaps during war and inter-war periods 
were estimated using information on the balance of payments provided by the German central 
bank (DeutscheBundesbank, 1998, 2005). Remaining missing values were estimated using 
trade balances as a proxy for capital flows (DeutscheBundesbank, 1976; Flora et al., 1983; 
Hardach, 1973). 
 
Private Consumption is taken from Flora et al. (1983), German Statistical Office, 
downloadable under www.gesis.oreg/histat (Bundesamt, 2013), Ritschl (2005), Abelshauser 
(1998), and Harrison (1988). 
  
Average height data are taken from the following sources: Germany (West und total): Jaeger 
et al. (2001), Komlos and Kriwy (2003); Germany (East): Jaeger et al. (2001), Komlos and 
Kriwy (2003); Bavaria: Baten (1999), Baten and Murray (2000), Harbeck (1960); 
Württemberg: Twarog (1997); Palatinate: Baten (1999), Baten and Murray (2000); Northrhine-
Westphalia: Blum (2011); (Blum, 2012). Average height is organized by birth date, reflecting 
socioeconomic conditions around birth since this is the most important period for the 
determination of final average adult height. 
 
Data in infant mortality rates are provided by Mitchell (2007) and measures the share number 
of infants (by 1000) who died within the first 12 months after birth. 
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Forestry: Germany had an established reputation as one of the most advanced nations involved 
in forestry management and inspired British and U.S. developments in silviculture (e.g. see 
Schlich (1904), Zon (1910), Hiley (1930), B.P.P. (1942-43), Heske (1938)). Information on 
German forestry stock was taken from Zon (1910), Zon et al. (1923), Hoffmann et al. (1965), 
and Endres (1922). 
 
Non-renewable resources: Fischer (1989) and Fischer and Fehrenbach (1995) provide detailed 
data on German mining activities including the number of employees in mining, covering the 
period until the 1970s. Information on quantities and market prices by commodity on an annual 
basis are available. Additional information was collected from Mitchell (2007). Data provided 
by Fischer (1989) and Fischer and Fehrenbach (1995) are also available by German state, which 
allows subtracting contemporary contributions of the mining sector of Alsace-Lorraine 
between 1871 and 1918. Moreover, the statistical offices of the German Empire and the Federal 
Republic of Germany provide information on the 1914 to 1923 as well as the post-1962 periods, 
respectively (Bundesamt, 2013; Germany. Statistisches Reichsamt., 1925). 
To assess the costs of depletion the number of employees in mining and their average 
wage were used. Data on the labour force in mining is provided by Fischer (1989), Fischer and 
Fehrenbach (1995), and the German Statistical Office (2013). Wages of mining workers are 
reported by Hoffmann et al. (1965), Kuczynski (1947), Mitchell (2007), and official 
contemporary statistics (Germany. Statistisches Reichsamt., 1925). 
 
Expenditure on schooling: Data on education expenditure is provided by Hoffmann et al. 
(1965) and Diebolt (1997, 2000). For the post-1990 period we use World Bank data on 
education expenditure. Missing values for the periods 1922-24 and 1938-48 have to be 
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estimated. For the former period, we assume that expenditures between 1921 and 1925 
developed gradually and apply linear interpolation. For the latter period we use Flora (#, p. 
585) who reports that the number of pupils and students in Germany dropped by 16.3 per cent 
between 1936 and 1950 – this occurred most likely due to population losses after WWII. The 
corresponding drop in education expenditure was 16.5 per cent. We assume that the 1939 
expenditure level was maintained until 1945, when the number of students plummeted. 
Therefore, we assume that the expenditure level between 1946 and 1948 was equal to the 1949 
figure. 
 
Carbon emissions: German carbon pollution estimates were taken from Andres et al. (1999) 
and Boden et al. (1995). 
 
TFP: Data on labour hours worked and real GDP is taken from Greasley and Madsen (2006). 
Information on capital stock for the period 1850 through 2000 is provided by Metz (2005). 
Missing values during and after WW2 have been estimated on the basis of Krengel (1958). 
Factor shares used were from Greasley and Madsen (2006), capital share is 0.60 and labour 
0.40. A Kalman filter of the TFP growth rate was estimated.  
 
Discount rates: Data on historical interest rates and government bond yields were taken from 
Homer and Sylla (2005) and Deutsche Bundesbank (2013)26. 
 
                                                          
26 Data download from http://www.bundesbank.de, accessed 23/9/2013 
